Bazaar – International Desk: Rising geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have once again pushed energy security to the center of the global economic agenda. The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil trade passes, remains one of the world’s most sensitive maritime chokepoints. According to U.S. Energy Information Administration data for 2025, more than 20 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products moved through the strait, a volume large enough that any serious disruption could send shockwaves through international markets.

Under these conditions, Indo-Pacific countries including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Thailand have intensified efforts to diversify their energy supplies in order to reduce dependence on the Persian Gulf. Higher LNG imports from the United States, deeper energy cooperation with African producers, and expanded investment in Pacific energy projects are all part of that strategy.

Yet the Ramadan War and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated that the issue is no longer limited to where energy is produced. The real strategic question is the security of the corridors through which energy is transported. Even if Asian economies succeed in sourcing part of their energy from outside the Gulf, much of that trade will still depend on vulnerable maritime routes.

The recent crisis has therefore made clear that energy geopolitics has entered a new phase. Supply diversification alone is insufficient if transit corridors remain exposed to conflict, military pressure, and irregular warfare. This is precisely where Iran and its regional allies have altered the strategic equation: not necessarily by dominating the seas in a conventional sense, but by proving that they can affect the cost, timing, and reliability of maritime commerce.

Bab el-Mandeb: A chokepoint of growing global importance

In recent years, Bab el-Mandeb has evolved from an important regional passage into one of the most critical geopolitical chokepoints in the world. This narrow strait linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden serves as the maritime bridge between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal. International estimates suggest that around 12 percent of global trade and close to 30 percent of global container traffic move through the Red Sea corridor.

Operations by Ansarallah in Yemen against ships linked to Israel and some Western shipping lines have significantly increased maritime transport costs. During periods of sustained attacks, many major shipping companies were forced to reroute vessels away from the Red Sea and around the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa, a path that is thousands of kilometers longer and substantially more expensive.

The consequences extend far beyond oil prices. Freight charges, insurance premiums, delivery schedules, and retail goods costs have all been affected. Recent warnings from the Australian Food and Grocery Council about the impact of the Middle East crisis on supply chain expenses illustrate how the effects of Red Sea insecurity are no longer confined to the Middle East. They now directly pressure Indo-Pacific economies and, by extension, the wider global market.

This development underscores a broader reality: maritime chokepoints are no longer merely passages on the map. They are pressure points in the global economy. A relatively localized security crisis can now produce cascading effects across food supply systems, industrial production schedules, and inflation dynamics in countries far from the conflict zone.

The rise of new actors in controlling maritime corridors

One of the most important geopolitical developments of the past decade has been the growing role of new actors in shaping international security. In the past, strategic waterways were largely controlled by formal naval fleets belonging to major powers. Today, however, emerging actors with asymmetric capabilities can influence the flow of global trade without possessing traditional naval superiority.

Ansarallah is a leading example of this transformation. By using drones, anti-ship missiles, and attritional maritime tactics, the group has shown that it can affect the security of one of the world’s most important trade corridors. The key strategic lesson is that disrupting global commerce does not require absolute command of the sea. The ability to create uncertainty, raise insurance costs, and impose operational delays can itself produce major geopolitical outcomes.

This marks a significant shift in the traditional meaning of sea control. Maritime power is no longer measured solely by carrier strike groups, destroyer fleets, or foreign naval bases. It increasingly includes the ability to interfere with logistical systems, challenge commercial confidence, and transform ordinary shipping routes into contested strategic spaces.

Iran’s wider regional network has reinforced this shift. Through allied groups and overlapping pressure points, Tehran has helped build a model of indirect influence in which maritime risk becomes a geopolitical instrument. That does not necessarily mean permanent closure of sea lanes, but rather the capacity to make those routes vulnerable enough that rival powers and global markets must constantly account for disruption.

The strategic link between Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb

One of the most important features of the current crisis is the geopolitical interconnection between the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. In practice, these two chokepoints form part of a single larger network of global energy and trade. A crisis in one almost inevitably affects the other.

If tensions in the Persian Gulf rise, pressure on the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb also tends to intensify, because alternative routes become more crowded, more expensive, and more exposed to security risks. For this reason, Asian countries seeking to reduce dependence on Hormuz continue to face structural limitations. Diversification of suppliers does not eliminate dependence on maritime corridors.

Even imports from Africa or the Atlantic basin cannot bypass the need for secure sea lanes. This is why the current maritime security crisis cannot be understood as a problem belonging to one specific region. It is part of a broader geopolitical competition over the control of trade flows, energy arteries, and global supply chains.

The developments in Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean suggest that the world has entered a new phase of geopolitical rivalry, one in which asymmetric warfare and pressure on supply chains have become as consequential as conventional military confrontation. In this environment, strategic leverage comes less from occupation of territory and more from the ability to threaten circulation: oil, goods, containers, and industrial inputs.

Asian powers respond as new alignments begin to form

The rise in maritime insecurity has pushed Asia’s major economic powers toward a more active security posture. Japan and South Korea, both among the world’s largest energy importers, are especially vulnerable to disruption in sea lines of communication.

In 2025, Tokyo and Seoul signed new agreements on cooperation in strategic energy reserves, maritime security, and logistics coordination. That these moves are taking place despite deep historical tensions between the two countries highlights the seriousness of their shared concern over energy security.

Australia has also expanded its participation in maritime security operations under Western-led coalition frameworks. At the same time, Canberra continues to prefer a multilateral posture and has sought to avoid direct entanglement in regional escalations. This balancing act reflects the dilemma facing many Indo-Pacific states: they want protected sea lanes, but they are cautious about becoming frontline participants in Middle Eastern conflicts.

For Western powers, the challenge is even more complex. For decades, they relied on maritime superiority as a foundation of global influence. But asymmetric threats are harder to neutralize than conventional fleets. They are cheaper for emerging actors to deploy, less predictable in form, and capable of imposing disproportionately high costs on the global economy.

The result is a strategic environment in which even advanced navies can secure passage only at rising financial and political cost. Convoy missions, missile defense deployments, and multinational patrols may reduce immediate threats, but they do not fully eliminate the structural vulnerability of narrow maritime chokepoints.

A new maritime order and the future of great-power competition

The evolving situation in the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean shows that the international system is moving toward a new maritime order. In this order, control over trade corridors, resilience of supply chains, and endurance in low-intensity attritional conflict may matter as much as traditional naval strength.

Western powers that once depended on uncontested maritime dominance now face a challenge that is more diffuse and difficult than conventional war. Asymmetric threats cost less for regional actors and their allies, yet they can generate enormous economic consequences for the rest of the world. This imbalance gives countries like Iran and aligned groups a form of leverage disproportionate to their conventional naval resources.

In response, the likelihood of new maritime coalitions forming across the Indo-Pacific is increasing. Asian states are gradually reaching the conclusion that energy security is no longer merely an economic issue. It is directly tied to national security, domestic stability, inflation management, and industrial continuity.

This means that future great-power competition will likely revolve more than ever around maritime chokepoints, the security of shipping lanes, and the management of prolonged supply disruptions. Wars of the future may not require territorial conquest to alter the balance of power. By interrupting the flow of commerce, delaying energy shipments, and driving up risk premiums, states and non-state actors can reshape global strategic calculations.

What Iran and its allies have demonstrated is not simply the capacity to threaten individual ships or narrow waterways. More importantly, they have shown that in a deeply interconnected world economy, the power to disturb circulation can rival the power to command territory. That is the core transformation in today’s maritime equation.